Introduction
After a two-year review process, the European Commission adopted on May 1 st 2004 a new Merger Regulation 1 , replacing the old EU Merger Regulation of 1990. In addition, guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers where issued 2 . During this review process, one of the most controversial and intensively debated issues surrounding the future regime of European merger control was the new substantive test, the so -called SIEC test.
This paper addresses the issue of whether the new merger test has made any difference in the way the Commission evaluates the competitive effects of mergers . We approach this question by reviewing the main arguments of why the test was changed and discuss the anticipated impact. It is argued that the new test can be expected to increase both the accuracy and effect iveness of merger contro l in two ways: First, it may close a gap in enforcement, which may have led to under-enforcement in the past , and second, it may add to clarity by eliminating ambiguities regarding the interpretation of the old test, which possibly led to over-enforcement in some cases .
The remainder of the paper looks at the evidence available to date. We review a number of cases and ask in what w ay -if any -the new merger regime has made a difference. In particular, we ask whether there is any evidence of the above issues of under -and overenforcement.
We conduct an exploratory review of recent cases notified under the new test where the Commission has identified competition concerns 3 . We focus on challenged mergers for two reasons. First, the assessment in such cases tends to be more elaborate and detailed. It is thus easier to identify the extent to which the new test and the guidelines h ave influenced the Commission's practice. Second, note that a change of the test was not really necessary in order to resolve the confusion regarding its interpretation. A simple clarification may have sufficed to ensure benign mergers are cleared. However, the existence of an enforcement gap is a different issue: if an enforcement gap was present under the old test, then the new test really matters. It follows that the "acid test" of whether the new test has an impact or not is to identify a "gap case". In ot her words, the new test is likely to make a difference if the re evidence that the Commission challenges a merger that would have been authorized under the old test. We focus on cases where the Commission has raised concerns in search of identifying s uch a gap case.
At the outset, we stress that this paper can not provide conclusive evidence on the impact of the New Merger Regime . For once, it is notoriously hard to establish what the correct counterfactual to the New Merger Regime is. T he adoption of a new test and merger guidelines cannot be expected to have a one-time, radical and sweeping impact on the Commission's decisional practice. The influen ce is more likely to be slow and gradual as the Commission and the merger control community at large adapt to the new rules of the game. Another reason as to why the evidence may not be conclusive at this time is that the vast majority of cases raise no competition concer ns. In this short period since the adoption, the new test and the guidelines could have potentially made a difference only in a handful of cases.
Our findings are briefly summarized as follows. As expected, there is no evidence of a radical change in the way the Commission assesses the competitive effects of mergers. However, there is evidence indicating a process towards emphasizing those relevant market characteristics that are indeed consistent with an effect s-based approach to merger control. In particular, we find that dominance continues to play an important role in most cases , and once established, appears sufficient to challenge a merger. With regard to horizontal mergers we find no case in our sample that is a clear -cut gap case. However, with regards to vertical mergers, we find that there is at least one case, which is likely to be a g ap case.
As a result, we conclude that the new merger test appears to have an impact.
The old and the new test
The old EU Merger Regulation, adopted in 1990, prohibits mergers that:
"create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effectiv e competition would be significantly impeded ".
The old substantive test invites two alternative interpretations. The first version interprets the test as a cumulative two -tier test: a concentration is prohibited if (i) it leads to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position as well as (ii) if the effect of such change in market structure amounts to a "significant impediment of effective competition" (SIEC). In other words, dominance is a necessary but not sufficient condition to prohibit a merger .
An alternative interpretation is that mergers that create or strengthen dominance automatically also impede effective competition. Advocates of this view argue that there is a single criterion, i.e. dominance. This interpretation implies that dominance is a single is both necessary and sufficient -that is, there is only one condition. Arguably the concept of "acting independently " does not provide an adequate basis for discriminating between dominant firms and non -dominant firms. No firm can set price independently of its customers or consumers: in general increasing price causes a loss of revenue; either because consumers turn to rival firms or because they drop out of the market. Even a textbook monopolist faces a downward sloping demand curve.
However, it is often overlooked that the independent requirement is not absolute; rather it is a matter of degree. A firm is dominant if it can behave independently to an appreciable extent 6 . This means that its decisions should be fairly insensitive to actions and reactions of competitors, customers and, ultimately, consumers.
In economics, sensitivity is typically measured by elasticity . The rivals' price and quantity elasticity measures, respectively, the percentage change in rivals' prices and quantities that follow from a one per cent change in the allegedly dominant firm's price. If the rivals' price and quantity elasticity are low, the firm may set its price independently of its competitors to an appreciable extent. Likewise a firm may have the power to behave -to an appreciable extent -independently of customers if the demand facing the allegedly dominant firm is relatively inelas tic.
The legal definition of dominance is thus very close to the economic notion of market power. Market power refers to the ability to influence important parameters of competition. In particular, a firm that is capable of profitably and durably increasi ng prices high above the competitive level holds significant market power. Almost all firms have some market power, though most have very little. Accordingly, the relevant question in competition cases is not whether market power is present, but whether it is important (i.e. substantial). A firm facing low demand elasticity and low rivals' price and quantity elasticities can behave independently of competitors and consumers to an appreciable extent . This is reflected in its ability to increase prices above competitive levels significantly. It thus follows that a dominant firm is one that enjoys s ubstantial market power 7 .
a. Dominance as a sufficient condition
As discussed above, one interpretation of the old test is that dominance is necessary and sufficient to prohibit a merger. If so, merger control is to focus on the impact on market structure, not on competitive effects. Besides the fact that this interpretation is economically flawed , it has also been explicitly dismissed by the Courts.
In particular, it is problematic to regard the creation or strengthening of dominance as sufficient to establish a significant impediment to competition. Despite creating or strengthening a dominant position, a merger may lead to welfare gains for consumers in the form of lower prices or increased innovation. This can happen for at least two reasons.
First, the merged entity may attain efficiencies such as marginal cost reductions, which give an incentive to lower prices 8 . This may fully offset the opposite incentive to raise prices resulting from increased market power . It is possible for prices in the market to fall and total output to rise post -merger.
Second, a merger may allow input suppliers to attain sufficient market power to offset the negative effects of monopson istic power. A dominant buyer may find it profitable to withhold input demand in order to obtain price concessions or better terms from its suppliers. Less input purchases may also lead to less output production. A merger between suppliers may create a dom inant position, which enhances countervailing seller power vis -à-vis a dominant buyer. This may lead to increased input and output sales and lower output prices.
As a result the creation or strengthening of dominance cannot in itself be s ufficient to prohibit a merger. The Courts have rejected the sufficiency of dominance and instead endorsed the two-tier interpretation of the old test. Dominance remains a necessary requirement. However, dominance is not sufficient for incompatibility. It must still be shown that compet ition is significantly impeded: In sum, it thus appears t hat the single criterion interpretation of the test (in particular the sufficiency of dominance) is neither economically sound, nor has it been endorsed by the courts.
b. Dominance as a necessary condition -the two-tier test
As discussed above, the two -tier interpretation of the old test restricts the concept of dominance to being necessary . This is the interpretation that t he Courts have also endorsed . The Commission 's approach has also evolved over the last decade and, in recent years, less reliance has been placed on market share and other structural indicators and greater emphasis has been given to evaluating the competitive characteristics of the market, the dynamics of competition between the merging parties, and the competitive effects of notified transactions.
It would seem that under this interpretation and practice no change of the test was necessary. The risk of over -enforcement is avoidable if proper attention is given to the second limb of the test. A merger that creates or strengthen dominance may still be authorized if efficiency gains or increased bargaining power vis -à-vis powerful buyers more than offsets the potential harm to consumers. But if the risk of too many false positives could be averted, why was it necessary to change the substan tive test? One answer relates to oligopoly theory, or as it has been coined succinctly to "closing the gap".
c. The new SIEC test: closing the g ap or clarification?
The new test does not insist on dominance being either necessary or sufficient. Why is that? One argument is that the old test leads to under-enforcement. A merger may have serious anti-competitive effects ev en in the absence of dominance , i.e. there may be an enforcement gap. The basic intuition behind this argument can be expressed as follows: If the merging parties sell very close substitutes, they impose on each other a significant competitive constraint. Pre-merger if a firm raises prices , customers may simply switch to its rival. However, post-merger, customers may have no other close substi tutes to turn to and the merged entity could raise prices significantly, irrespective of whether it becomes the market leader 11 . The notion of single-firm dominance envisages a situation where only the leading firm may be dominant in any market. It follows that by making dominance a necessary requirement, the old test offered no legal basis to challenge anti-competitive mergers between firms producing close substitutes , where the merged entity was not the market leader -hence the gap.
However, if dominance is properly understood as significant market power there is no reason why market leadership is necessary for dominance. Moreover, the ability to increase prices above competitive levels depends on more than just market shares. In tight oligopolies, produc t differentiation reduces the intensity of competition and allows several firms to enjoy market power simultaneously even if none of them emerges as a clear market leader. Here, market power is closely related to the degree of substitutability between different competing brands, rather than market shares per se. Market leadership (and market shares in general) are a poor proxy for market power also in cases where rivals -even larger ones -face cost or capacity constraints (e.g. in the electricity industry ). In regulated industries, the market leader may be constrained in its ability to exercise market power by tighter rules, which do not apply to other large -but non-leading -rivals
12 .
Yet in practice, the assessment of dominance relies heavily on market shares. According to well-settled case law, a market share above 50% is strong evidence of dominance. A firm 11 Conversely, if the merging parties sell distant substitutes there may be little impact on prices even if the merged entity becomes the market leader. 12 Needless to say market leaders may not be dominant. A firm could have a large market share and the market could appear concentrated, not because the firm has market power but because it has low costs or sells superior products. A market leader is not dominant where (i) innovation is taking place at a rapid pace (ii) there is fierce competition between lar ge players (iii) entry into a market is easy. Moreover even a monopolist may be unable to exercise latent market power if it sells durable goods or if cannot not to expand sales beyond the monopoly level.
with lower market shares, say between 40% and 50%, may also be dominant, particularly if it faces much smaller rivals. Either way, this would seem to imply that dominance requires market leadership (what is more troublesome is that market leadership may itself imply dominance). Given this state of play, it seems likely that a gap in fact exists in practice.
Why change the test?
Why was it necessary to change the test? In the end, there are two views (if not to say two camps).
First, the new test clarifies the situation. According to this view, the old two -tier test was in principle capable to address the perceived problems, such as the gap or the incorporation of efficiencies. Nevertheless, it was necessary to change the test to make it clear that this was in fact the case . It should be noted in this context that clarity in itself has a value and in fact may a have an economic effect. Being clear about the test of an antitrust agency will have both a signaling as well as a reputation effect throughout the market. More generally, the impact of an antitrust policy may be much larger through action that it does not have to take (because it is clear tha t it would be prohibited and thus those mergers are not even attempted), than through observable actions that are taken 13 . In this sense, clarifying the merger test has real impact on markets and the new merger test does make a substantive difference.
The second view is that the new test makes a difference in the analysis of mergers itself. Note that the dominance requirement zooms in on the market power of the merged entity, ignoring market wide equilibrium effects. Ignoring these equilibrium effects may lead to significant errors. For example, t he overall impact on prices in a tight oligopoly may be significant, even though a merger may increase the market p ower of the merged entity to a degree short of dominance. Another example is a merger involving a s mall firm with one close to being dominant. This merger may create dominance , yet the merger itself may have only a negligible impact on competitive performance. Similarly, a merger involving a dominant firm will almost certainly lead to a strengthening of dominance yet the negative effect may be marginal . The ultimate consideration of merger enforcement is not whether the resulting merged entity enjoys significant market power but whether market power in the industry increases to such a degree that consume r welfare deteriorates significantly.
The rearrangement of the two -limb test articulates SIEC as (the single) sufficient condition for incompatibility and eliminates "dominance" as a necessary condition for SIEC itself. As a result, the Commission is now able to assess how a given concentration affects what would happen to prices, outputs and other important features of an oligopolistic marketincluding efficiencies -if firms responded in an individually rivalro us way to market conditions, without any i ncreased likelihood of engaging in tacit collusion.
Another aspect of the new merger regime has been the explicit recognition of efficiencies , as articulated in the merger guidelines. Despite the fact that the Commission could take efficiencies into account under the old test it had little -if any -practical relevance. The problem with this view is that the 'concentration privilege' implicitly assumes that every merger generates the same level of positive efficiency. This is of course factuall y wrong. Some mergers are very efficient, others are not. I t is more than doubtful that the average efficiency level of mergers is even positive 16 . As a result of these empirical facts, it simply makes no sense to argue that average efficiencies are assumed up to a level of dominance. Precisely because there are no efficiencies on average, is it necessary to consider efficiency explicitly. The new test, and especially the guidelines, allows for a more explicit consideration of efficiencies in terms of the ex tent to which such efficiencies could offset anti -competitive effects.
What are the expected benefits of the new merger regime? It follows from the above arguments that the new test and the guidelines should increase merger control effectiveness. Expected benefits can be classified into less false negatives (underenforcement) and less false positives (over-enforcement).
a. Less false negatives
As explained above the primary justification for reformulating the test is to eliminate the requirement to show do minance to challenge a merger. This is expected to reduce false negatives, i.e. clearing anti -competitive mergers , because the test can take full account of the equilibrium effects of the merger. Oligopoly theory is used, either implicitly or explicitly to make this assessment.
Oligopoly theory examines situations in which a market is supplied by a small and fixed number of players. Each firm chooses its price (or quantity or other variable in which competition occurs) given the prices of its rivals. This gives a best response function, which is the set of prices that a firm would charge in response to any price configuration set by rivals. The equilibrium occurs where these best response functions intersect. In other words, each firm's price is a best reac tion to the prices that the others are setting .
When two firms merge, their best response reaction function shifts upward: in other words, even if rivals did not change their prices, the merged firm would find it profitable to set a higher price. The size of this price rise will depend upon a variety of factors, including the number of firms in the market, relative efficiency, demand elasticity, the substitutability of the products, etc.
An immediate implication of this economic approach is that t he effect of the merger on the merging firms does not tell the whole story. Non-merging rivals will react to the merger and raise their prices, resulting in a new equilibrium. In other words, when firms compete in prices, the final equilibrium effect will exceed the direct effect on the merging parties 17 . In the end, there are two effects: the initial effect on the merging parties and the final equilibrium effect when the full set of reactions and counter reactions has occurred. It is the equilibrium effect that af fects consumers and that thus captures the effect of the merger on competition 18 . A merger test -such as the dominance test -that focuses almost exclusively on the market power of the merged firm may thus not fully capturing the full equilibrium effect. It is important to realize that t hese equilibrium effects do not arise from any collusion between firms, or from any trade -off of future/current profits. It is simply a change in the competitive equilibrium.
Manifestations of equilibrium effects beyond the above example arise in other less publicized but potentially empirically more relevant scenarios. Examples include :
-Elimination of potential competition : a single potential entrant exercises a constraint not on any individual incumbent firm, but more gen erally, on all member of the oligopoly. A pre-emptive take-over of the potential entrant by an incumbent will allow all members of the oligopoly to raise prices even if there is no market leader and no possibility to tacitly collud e.
-Control of entry barr iers: Similar equilibrium effects arise when an incumbent acquires control through merger of a barrier to entry or is able to influence access to the market. A prominent example is that of a non -dominant firm acquiring control over a small innovative rival to prevent or delay the introduction of a new product. 17 In markets where products are relatively undifferentiated and capacity primarily distinguishes firms and shapes the nature of their competition the concern is the opposite. The merged firm may find it profitable unilaterally to raise price and suppress output. The merger provides the merged firm a larger base of sales on which to enjoy the resulting price rise and also eliminates a competitor to whic h customers otherwise would have diverted their sales. Intuitively the incentive to raise prices is higher than in the case of price competition because the products of the merging firms are not just close but perfect substitutes. However although its rivals are expected to raise their prices as a rational response to what the merged firm likely will do, they will actually be taking advantage of the price rise by maintaining or increasing their outputs. If they or a group of new entrants had sufficient capa city, output would be expanded by the merged entities' competitors partially offsetting the merged firm's own output contraction. Thus, unless rivals are capacity constrained, there is a risk of overstating the ultimate effects of the merger if the reactio n of competitors is not taken into account. By softening competition in the market t his benefits the acquiring company and all other incumbents. However it may not be possible to argue that the merger creates or strengthens dominance in a meani ngful sense.
-Raising rivals costs: Various other possibilities arise in the context of nonhorizontal mergers. Vertical integration can considerably harm consumer welfare even if none of the merging firms is per se dominant in their respective markets. F or instance, when an upstream firm merges with a downstream firm that upstream firm has lower incentives to engage in price -cutting competition with other upstream firms in order to serve non -integrated downstream firms. As a result, the rival upstream firms can charge higher prices for their inputs other things being equal. This raises the costs of the unintegrated downstream sector. This increase in costs is then reflected in higher final good prices, so that the integrated downstream firm can in turn raise its prices and make higher profits. The end result in that final goods prices have gone up, total producer surplus have gone up and consumers are worse off. A monopoly that integrates downstream may have the ability and incentive to raise its downstream rivals' costs. This can lead to significant price increases downstream even if the merged entity falls short of acquiring downstream dominance.
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-Other theories of harm o perating through equilibrium effect relate to (i) mergers that reduce buyer power, by allowing a better segmentation of the market for price discrimination purposes, (ii) mergers in network markets that tip the market towards a standard that favors incumbents, or (iii) mergers that allow the joint control of an essential facility 20 .
With regard to efficiencies, it is unlikely that false negatives will be avoided by the new merger regime. This is because the burden of proof with regards to efficiencies has been largely put on the parties. There are of course good reasons for doing so, but it is nevertheless unlikely to help reduce under -enforcement of very inefficient mergers.
b. Less false positives
The new test focuses on the merger-induced changes to the competitive environment, not on whether the merged entity reaches an intolerable level of market power. Put another way, the SIEC test directly measures the "delta," i.e. the degree of change in the dynamics 19 Most such mergers ca n hardly be said to strengthen upstream dominance. In the case of a monopoly integrating downstream such possibility does not even exist. 20 The SIEC test is more flexible than the SLC test. By identifying a strengthening of dominance explicitly as a possible instance of a significant impediment to competition, the SIEC test provides a clear basis to challenge harmful mergers that the SLC test might not be able to stop. This is because "strengthening" could be taken to include more than simply an increase in market power; it could be interpreted as putting more weight on preserving existing levels of market power or other harmful effects that cannot easily be modeled in market power terms. For instance, one scenario concerns markets where a series of small me rgers is taking place. Here each individual merger may not in itself lessen competition substantially yet the cumulative anticompetitive impact may be large.
of competition posed by a merger, while the dominance requirement in the old test in essence measures how much competition is left ove r, as opposed to how much has been lost. SIEC was also a condition under the old test but as discussed above, problems of interpretation, and the central role played by dominance meant that in practice mergers could be challenged on structural indicators a lone. By eliminating dominance as a necessary condition the new test focuses more directly on the principal economic question raised by a merger, namely whether compet ition is likely to be reduced. Such effects-based approach should lead to reduction of false positives , i.e. the prohibition of pro -competitive mergers. Example includes:
-Distant substitutes . The Commission may find it easier to authorize mergers involving firms selling products, which are very differentiated even if the merged entity will have the largest share in the market.
-Efficiencies. When efficiencies are large enough -in particular larger than assumed by the 'concentration privilege' -parties should have an incentive to bring forward efficiency claims whenever there is convincing evidence that they satisfy the condition outlined in the Merger Guidelines. As a result, over-enforcement is likely to be reduced.
-Mergers that create countervailing buyer power vis -à-vis dominant buyers . The
Commission has in the past taken due considera tion of countervailing buyer power but not as way to dismiss concerns with the creation of upstream dominance. Yet it is ironic that if the merged entity actually does acquire dominance (i.e. increase their selling power substantially) this may reduce the ability of a downstream monopsony or oligopsony to constrain input purchases . As in the case of efficiencies the old test could have accommodated this possibility because dominance was not sufficient in itself to render a merger anti -competitive. However, the new test places the emphasis on assessing the competitive effects of the merger allowing for a more effective distinction between the impact of downstream buyer and the impact on ultimate consumers.
-Mergers with a de-minimis impact. Most mergers invol ving dominant firms lead to a strengthening of dominance. Furthermore, a merger may increase market power marginally to the level of dominance. Often the impact on competition of such mergers will be de -minimis. This will be the case particularly in very s mall markets. Emphasis on identifying significant effects will allow the Commission to dismiss concerns in such markets more effectively without deterring broadly beneficial mergers.
-Mergers where single dominance replaces collective dominance . Consider a market where firms coordinate behavior pre -merger. A merger may disrupt the market so as to render further coordination impossible. Particularly if the merged entity reaches a position of single dominance. Under the old test the tendency would be to challenge such mergers on the basis that the merger creates dominance. However such mergers may be pro -competitive on balance since it is preferable that a subset of firms coordinate (i.e. the merging parties) than all firms coordinate (tacitly).
The Impact of the new test -some early evidence
We know turn to the empirical assessment. As we stated above, we do not consider the evidence presented below conclusive for a number of reasons.
First, the Commission's movement towards an effects -based approach in merger control has been gradual and started some time before adopting the new test and the merger guidelines. In several earlier decisions the Commission emphasized the importance of closeness of substitution, either to establish that a merger involving firms selling close substitutes may lead to a significant increase in market power -despite low market sharesor conversely to reject claims that a merger involving firms selling distant substitutes would raise concerns -despite high market shares. Even before launching the Merger Review there was some i nternal debate on the scope of the dominance test. Several cases were cleared in the absence of dominance or coordination despite suggestions that the equilibrium effects might have been significant 21 . Moreover, the Commission published several studies on the issue of efficiencies 22 and the 2002 Green Paper hinted at the need to take efficiencies more explicitly into account 23 . This indicates that in the past few years the Commission has increasingly deviated from a structural approach to merger enfor cement. This process was further strengthened with the adoption of the new test and the guidel ines in May 2004, yet triggered no revolution in enforcement.
Second, the process just described is likely to be gradual. Case-handlers, new and experienced need to adapt to the new regulation and the merger guidelines. To focus on competitive effects , more knowledge of industrial economics is needed. Market definition and market share remain important but not central to th e assessment. Instead, the market investigation must be geared towards an analysis of the economic rationale for the merger and the likely conduct post -merger by market participants . Investigative techniques need to be adapted to the new focus on competitive effects. Furthermore such effects are to b e assessed against the most likely counterfactual . Like in any policy change, it takes time, as well as moving up the learning curve.
Given the above considerations, we conduct an exploratory analysis of the new test, by formulating two hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 1 ("the gap"):
The new test has reduced false negatives by focusing on the equilibrium effects of the merger . In particular, dominance is not necessary .
Hypothesis 2 ("the clarification"):
The new test has (unequivocally) shifted the emphasis away from structural indicators towards competitive effects . In particular, dominance is not sufficient.
The first hypothesis is confirmed if the Commission challenges a merger which threatens to increase prices significantly (or otherwise reduce consumer welfare) , even though it does not create or strengthen dominance . Hypothesis 1 is thus confirmed by evidence of a gap case, in which case the new test has clearly made a difference.
The second hypothesis is less clear cut in terms of identifying the impact of the new test , because it relates to the Commission's interpretation of the old test and whether there was a need to clarify it. Hypothesis 2 is supported by e vidence of a case where the Commission clears a merger even if it creates or strengthens dominance. Whether such evidence suggests that the new test changed anything is a matter of interpretation. If the old test was to be implemented in line with a proper two -tier test, and this was clear, th en evidence in support of hypothesis 2 does not indicate that the new test has had any impact. On the other hand, if a proper two -tier test was not in fact implemented in practice, then evidence for Hypothesis 2 implies that the new test makes a difference.
Our sample of cases in listed in the Appendix. We look at cases notified under the new test between May 1 st 2004 and October 12 th 2005 and restrict ourselves to cases where competition concerns were identified. Th is leaves us with 23 cases out of a total of 425, i.e. approx. 5%. Of those cases in our sample, 18 were cleared in phase 1 subject to remedies , while the remaining 5 cases required an in-depth investigation. There were no prohibitions during this period 24 .
We have focused on challenged merge rs notifies under the new test because we believe that this allows us to address the two hypothesis without going into an exhaustive analysis of all cases. By focusing on challenged mergers we are able to address the first hypothesis, namely that the new test has made a difference by covering the gap. However, regarding hypothesis 2, unconditional clearances will undoubtedly contain relevant information. Nonetheless, we believe that looking at challenges may reveal something regarding the second hypothesis . This is because if the Commission was concerne d with challenging a benign merger it would explicitly dismiss possible defenses, in particular efficiencies. Moreover, analysis of mergers notified under the old test will allow for a deeper analysis of both hypothesis, through for instance systematic econometric evidence . This is clearly an area in need of further work before a final conclusion can be drawn .
Before discussing the two hypothesis in more detail, let us make one preliminary observation. The evidence in our sample suggests that the Commission has not departed from dominance except for in a few cases. Single and collective dominance continue to be the pillars of the competitive harm . Out of the 23 cases in our sample , 5 cases raised concerns with collective dominance and 13 with single dominance. In 3 cases -J&J/Guidant, Siemens VA Tech and Lufthansa/Swiss -dominance was less important, while an analysis emphasizing equilibrium effects was done. In Bertelsmann/Springer the focus was on the potential of the merging parties to raise prices (with no reference to either dominance or SIEC) , while in Total/Gaz de France the concern has been with impeding access to an essential facility. Total/Gaz de France is worth mentioning as possibly the first Commission's decision where the word dominance is not mentioned at all.
(a) Evidence on Hypothesis 1: the gap -dominance is not necessary
As already mentioned, d ominance continues to play an important role in most cases. In particular, phase 1 cases. The Commission appears to rely less on dominance in phase 2 cases. We conjecture that this is because the Commission feels less comfortable with problematic cases in the absence of clear indications of dominance . This may prompt a phase 2 investigation. Possibl y merging parties may also be more familiar with the concept of dominance and thus better prepa red to offer clear-cut remedies, thus preventing a costly and lengthy second phase . In any case it seems neither the Commission nor outside practitioners are yet confident that anti-competitive effects in the absence of dominance can be dealt with in phase 1.
A possible exception is Lufthansa/Swiss. In this case the Commission made no reference to the creation or strengthening of dominance. Instead, it argued that Swiss is a direct competitor of Lufthansa and the acquisition would thus eliminate or si gnificantly reduce competition in a number of intra-European routes. It also argued that the source of market power in this market derived from ownership or access to a sufficient number of slots. Consequently, remedies involved the sale of a number of slots to a potential entrant. No additional assets associated with serving a route were deemed necessary . Nevertheless, this case is not likely to be a gap case. Lufthansa/Swiss enjoys very high market shares in the affected routes and entry would be very unlikely in the absence of remedies. Arguably then, the merged entity could have been declared dominant and the Commission would have likely followed this route under th e old test.
In Siemens/VA Tech the Commission came closer to challenging a merger which could not be challenged under the old test. In the market for mechanical metallurgy and plant building there where 3 main competitors pre -merger: SMS, VA Tech and Dani eli. Siemens was not present in this market but had a minority shareholding with no control in SMS. By allowing Siemens to take control of VA tech, the merger would have resulted in a substantial weakening of competitive pressure exerted by SMS on VA Tech given Siemens participation in SMS. Of relevance here is that the Commission acknowledged that market shares were of limited importance , as firms competed to win individual bids. Instead the Commission emphasized the fact that SMS and VA tech were closest competitors. All this might indicate that dominance was not necessary in this case. On the other hand, the Commission also relied on the fact that SMS and VA Tech appeared to be the market leaders in a strongly concentrated market. As a result it is possible that the Commission would have also challenged the merger under the old test, arguing that the merger would allow VA Tech to acquire dominance.
Overall, we find no horizontal merger in our sample which could clearly constitute a gap case. As a result, there is little evidence to date in support of hypothesis 1 in horizontal mergers.
With regard to vertical mergers, we find that the Commission was less reluctant to assess equilibrium effects. In Apollo/Bakelite the Commission considered that the merged entity would leverage its dominant position upstream in mono-functional ester (cardura) to increase market power in formulated systems downstream. According to the Commission, since Apollo was not active in formulated systems, its incentives to supply cardura to Bakelite's competitors would likely change after the transaction. Such conduct would have reinforced Bakelite 's already strong position (30 -40% market share) in this market. What is noteworthy in this case is that the Commission argues that the merg er would not allow Bakelite to acquire dominance downstream, as would be expected under the old test.
Instead the Commission indicates that the vertical effects would reinforce the market position of Bakelite -an approach more in line with an equilibrium effects analysis.
In Honeywell/Novar the Commission considered possible input foreclosure effects in the market for fire alarm systems in Scandinavian countries. In this case Honeywell supplied smoke detectors to ESMI, a subsidiary of Schneider, which in turn was competing with Novar on the market for fire alarm systems. Thus, following the merger , the main upstream component supplier would become a competitor on the market for systems downstream. The Commission assessed whether Honeywell would have the possibility and incentive to squeeze out of the market those system suppliers, who depend on the merged entity for its component supplies, in particular ESMI (f or example by increasing the price of detectors ).
The Commission dismissed such concerns on the basis that a significant increase of the prices of fire detectors would be unprofitable for the merged entity, because ESMI could find alternative suppliers and it was not a close competitor of Novar. The analysis had an obvious "equilibrium effects" flavor but since the input foreclosure concerns were ultimately dropped this case does not constitute a "gap" case.
More recently, the Commission challenged the merger between E .ON and MOL in Hungary (this merger was not included in our original sample) . MOL enjoyed a quasimonopoly in the supply of wholesale gas and E.ON has a strong commercial presence in downstream markets. The Commission argued that the merged entity would have the ability and incentive to raise the cost of access to wholesale gas to rivals downstream. The evidence suggested the potential losses from reduced sales at wholesale level would be more than offset by increased gas prices in retail gas markets. Thus the merger would likely lead to SIEC even though there was no evidence E.ON would ac quire a dominant position downstream. It thus appears that this case is possibly a "gap" case.
Overall, with regards to vertical mergers, we find that in several cases explicit equilibrium effects analysis in the assessment of the competitive effects is u ndertaken. In addition, we find that there is at least one case, which is likely to be a gap case. As a result, we find some evidence in our sample in support of Hypothesis 1.
(b) Evidence on Hypothesis 2: the clarification -dominance is not sufficient
As already mentioned , dominance remains the most common way to establish serious concerns. Within our sample, we find no cases where the Commission considers the possibility that the creation or strengthening of dominance might in itself be insufficient to raise competition concerns.
Specifically, dominance is often based on high market shares (and occasionally entry barriers). For instance, in Pernord/Ricard the Commission argued that the merger created or strengthened a dominant position in a number o f markets; essentially based on a combined market share above 50% (and the overlap above 5%). Yet, there are cases where high market shares are not decisive. In Bertelsmann/Springer combined market shares are above 50% yet the joint venture was cleared wi thout remedies after an -in-depth investigation. According to the Commission, competitors within and outside Germany were able to shift, free or expand capacity and thus exercise a competitive constrain on the JV. In the accessory market in Johnson and John son/Guidant high market shares (sometimes above 70%) were not deemed a problem because of product homogeneity and lack of capacity constraints.
Although dominance is decisive and frequently based on high market shares, the Commission's analysis has moved towards a more effects -based approach. For instance in one market in Bayer/Roche (topical antifungals), the Commission argues that " the parties very high combined market share, the significant competitive overlap and the low market shares of the remaining competitors by themselves raise serious doubts ". In contrast, in another market (plain antacids in Austria) the combined market share was 55 -60% with a 10-15% overlap, yet no concerns were raised since any attempt to raise prices would have allowed other substitutes to capture market share. Such tension between a dominance -based and an effects -based analysis is also present in other cases. In Reuters/Telerate the Commission dismissed concerns with creation of dominance in the market for real-time data. However, without making any reference to dominance it raised concerns in the market for market-data platforms were Reuters has more than 85% share and Telerate less than 5%.
An important development is that in a few cases a position of dominance was establis hed on the basis that the merging parties were closest substitutes. For instance, In Novartis/Hexal it is argued the merger would create a market leader and the concentration would combine two products, which a substantial number of consumers would regard as their first and second choice . Thus, the Commission argues that d ue to the high combined market share of the parties and the diminished competition between the two remaining players on this market, the concentration would threaten to create a position o f single dominance. In a way, this subsumes the analysis of equilibrium effects under the concept of dominance.
Efficiencies continue to play a negligible or hidden role in either phase 1 or phase 2 merger investigations. A notable exception was Procter&Gamble/Gillete . In this case, the Commission acknowledged that "enlarging the product portfolio might bring efficiencies to retailers and customers, for example benefits from having only one partner to negotiate with (.one-stop-shop.), suppliers having stronger innovation capacities, and economies of scale and scope". 25 However, countervailing buyer power, rather than efficiencies tilted the balance against portfolio effects.
Overall, the evidence regarding Hypothesis 2 is somewhat mixed. Competition concer ns continue to be associated with the establishment of dominance in most cases and dominance, once established , appears sufficient to challenge a merger. On the other hand, dominance is often dismissed if firms are distant competitors even if market shares are very high. This suggests that dominance remains a sufficient condition, yet more than just high market shares are necessary to reach a finding of dominance and to challenge a mergersuch as when merging firms sell distant products. The implications of such an approach for efficiency claims is hardly surprising. There is little incentives for merging parties to bring forward efficiency claims. If efficiencies cannot trump a finding of dominance, it is best to focus on rebutting such finding.
Conclusion
This paper assesses the impact of the new merger regime , which became effective on May 1 st 2004. Even though it is too early to come to definite conclusions , we assess the available evidence to date and ask whether there are any signs that the new te st has made a difference. As expected, there is no evidence of a radical change in the way the Commission assesses the competitive effects of mergers. However, there is strong evidence that indicates a process towards emphasizing those relevant market char acteristics that are indeed consistent with an effects-based, equilibrium approach to merger control.
In particular, with regards to horizontal mergers there has been no clear -cut gap case. Competition concerns continue to be associated with the establi shment of dominance in most cases, and dominance once established appears sufficient to challenge a merger. This suggests that dominance remains a sufficient condition, yet more than just high market shares are necessary to reach a finding of dominance. With regard to vertical mergers, we find several cases where an explicit assessment of equilibrium effects is undertaken. In addition, we find that there is at least one case, which is likely to be a gap case, indicating that the new merger test did have an impact.
It is argued that the current approach leaves little incentives to merging parties to bring forward efficiency claims. If efficiencies cannot trump a finding of dominance, it is best to focus on rebutting such finding. Further progress is needed a s regards efficiency analysis.
Parties should be encouraged to explain the possible efficiency motivations for their mergers and efficiencies should be the basis to clear an otherwise anti -competitive merger or to reduce the scope of remedies .
So has the new test had an impact? We submit that the evidence would suggest an affirmative answer at this point. The new test directs attention to the competitive effects of the proposed merger. Even though the Commission had gradually embraced an effectsbased approach under the old test, the SIEC test has reinforced this trend.
